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 Financial Value of Brands in Mergers and Acquisitions: 
Is Value in the Eye of the Beholder? 
 
Abstract 
Firms frequently engage in merger and acquisition deals. In these transactions, brands 
account for significant but differential proportions of overall transaction value. Extant marketing 
literature on financial value of brands focuses on drivers of financial value only within a firm. 
However, in a merger and acquisition context, value of brands also depends on how their new 
owners might leverage them in the marketplace. This study identifies and empirically tests both 
the target and acquirer characteristics that affect the value of target firm’s brands in mergers and 
acquisitions. Furthermore, the authors examine the moderating role of deal type and target firm 
sales growth on a subset of main effects. The results suggest that target marketing capability and 
acquirer brand portfolio diversity have positive effect on target’s brand(s) value. Deal type 
inhibits the impact of acquirer portfolio diversity on target’s brand value. Target firm sales 
growth inhibits the impact of target’s marketing capability on target’s brand value. 
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 Brands are critical assets in mergers and acquisitions (Keller 1993; Rao, Mahajan and 
Varaiya 1991). For example, Constellation Brands Inc. justifies the acquisition of Robert 
Mondavi as follows:  
The acquisition of Robert Mondavi supports the company’s strategy of strengthening the 
breadth of its portfolio across price segments to capitalize on the overall growth in the 
premium, superpremium and fine wine categories. The Company believes that acquired 
Robert Mondavi brand names have strong brand recognition globally.  
Constellation Brands, 2005 10-K filing 
In several of these transactions, firms paid significantly higher prices to acquire targeted 
brands. In a watershed transaction, Philip Morris acquired Kraft for $12.9 billion, which was four 
times its book value. Reflecting on the premium paid, Philip Morris CEO, Hamish Marshall 
concluded, “The future of consumer marketing belongs to the companies with the strongest 
brands,” (Biggar and Selame 1992). Recently, HP purchased Compaq’s brands for $1.5 billion 
where total transaction value was $24 billion. Table 1 provides a set of recent transactions and 
illustrates the variance in brand value as a percentage of firm value.   
What is the source of heterogeneity in the targeted brand’s value across mergers and 
acquisitions? Extant marketing literature would argue that each brand has a different potential for 
generating future cash flows as a result of differences in brand-specific factors such as price 
premium (cf. Srivastava, Shervani and Fahey 1998). Although this approach is valid, acquirers 
may have different cash flow expectations from the brands independent of brand-specific factors. 
For example, in 1994, Quaker Oats paid $1.7 billion for the Snapple brand, a price which was 
higher than Coca-Cola and other bidders’ offers (Deighton 2002). Similarly, PepsiCo and Coca-
Cola bid different prices in the competition to acquire Quaker Oats’ brand portfolio (especially 
Gatorade), $13.4 billion and $15.75 billion respectively (4 December 2004, New York Times). 
Taken together, these examples point to two sources of heterogeneity in brand value in the 
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 context of mergers and acquisitions: (a) different brands have different financial values and (b) 
buyers vary in their cash flow expectations from brands.  
The objective of this paper is to understand the factors that determine the value of target 
firms’ brands in the context of mergers and acquisitions. Brand value is defined as “the 
incremental cash flows which accrue to branded products over and above the cash flows which 
would result from sale of unbranded products” (Simon and Sullivan 1993)1. In the marketing 
literature, conceptual and empirical work focuses on antecedents to brand value within a firm 
(e.g., Farquhar and Ijiri 1991). Although prior studies incorporate important and relevant factors 
(e.g., market share), they do not address acquirer’s perspective of brand value. Only Mahajan, 
Rao and Srivastava (1994) allude to the importance of acquirer’s perspective on target firm’s 
brand value, but they do not provide empirical tests of specific target and acquirer characteristics 
that could affect the value of target firms’ brands in a merger and acquisition transaction. Even 
though firms allocate substantial amounts of resources to acquire brands and brands continue to 
be of strategic importance to firms, there is dearth of academic research on factors that influence 
value of brands, especially in the context of mergers and acquisitions (Table 2). 
 Against this background, we contribute to marketing literature in the following way. 
First, we identify and examine the impact of both target and acquirer characteristics on target 
firm’s brand value in the mergers and acquisitions context. We test for the relative effects of 
target and acquirer marketing capabilities and brand strategies on a target’s brand value. We find 
that the target’s marketing capability and acquirer’s brand portfolio diversity affect target’s brand 
value positively.  
                                                 
1 Brand value can also be defined from consumer perspective (e.g., Keller 1993). The context of this study is 
mergers and acquisitions so brand value from firm’s perspective is more appropriate than value from consumer 
perspective. 
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 Second, we investigate the moderating effect of deal type (horizontal acquisition vs. 
others) on following relationships: target firm’s marketing capability and target’s brand value, 
acquirer’s brand portfolio diversity and target’s brand value. We find that the positive impact of 
acquirer’s brand portfolio diversity on target’s brand value is lower when the acquisition is 
horizontal. This finding corroborates the argument that horizontal transactions cause brand 
redundancies. Brand redundancies between the acquirer and target lead to divestment of some of 
the target’s brands. We also study the interaction between the target’s sales growth and the 
target’s marketing capability. We find that the positive the impact of target’s marketing 
capability on target’s brand value is less when the target’s sales growth is higher. This finding 
suggests that target firms can increase the financial value of their brands when they generate 
sales growth, even if their marketing spending is not efficient at generating sales growth.  
Third, we use an accounting (NPV based) estimate of brand value as reported in 10-K 
and merger and acquisition documents of acquirer firm in the analysis. Prior empirical work on 
brand value extracts the value of brands from aggregate measures such as Tobin’s q (e.g., Simon 
and Sullivan 1993). We use the dollar value that an acquirer firm attaches to a target firm’s 
brand(s) in a merger and acquisition transaction as the measure of brand value. The precision of 
parameter estimates in the analysis is likely to be higher than precision of estimates in other 
studies because the measure does not include the value of other intangible assets like more 
aggregate measures, such as Tobin’s q or goodwill, do.  
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 Model Development 
The theoretical model is developed from the following streams of research: (i) resource-
based view (RBV) and (ii) brand strategy. The RBV literature portrays the firm as a collection of 
resources and capabilities (e.g., Barney 1991; Wernerfelt 1984). Amit and Schoemaker (1993, 
p.35) define resources as “stocks of available factors that are owned or controlled by the firm” 
and they define capabilities as “the firm’s capacity to deploy resources, usually in combination, 
using organizational processes, to effect a desired end.”  The fundamental premise in the RBV 
literature is that firms differ in terms of their strategic resources and capabilities (Barney 1991). 
The source of heterogeneity stems from imperfect tradability of strategic resources. Barney 
(1986) argues that the heterogeneity in resources and capabilities may explain why potential 
acquirers have different value expectations from the same strategic assets. Makadok (2001) 
demonstrates analytically how resource-deployment capability leads to differential value 
expectations from same resources among potential acquirers.  
In the marketing literature, brands (and brand equity) are identified as market-based 
assets and sources of competitive advantage (Bharadwaj, Varadrajan and Fahey 1993; 
Srivastava, Shervani and Fahey 1997). Brands conform to the asset properties that lead to market 
imperfections (e.g., rarity, inimitability). Thus, firms differ in their market-based assets and 
capabilities. Consequently, in a merger and acquisition transaction, we expect that the acquirer’s 
cash flow expectations from the target firm’s brand portfolio should vary as a function of target 
and acquirer’s marketing capabilities.    
The RBV perspective points only to capabilities in explaining value expectations from a 
target’s strategic assets. However, the brand strategy literature suggests that there are other target 
and acquirer characteristics that could affect the formation of an acquirer’s expectations from a 
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 target’s brands. We use two premises from brand strategy literature in developing the conceptual 
model.  
The first premise is that choice of brand strategy has performance implications. The 
branding strategy literature identifies the presence of three main branding strategies in practice: 
corporate, house of brands and mixed in practice (Laforet and Saunders 1994, 1999). On a 
branding strategy continuum, one end is corporate branding strategy where the firm only uses 
one brand name across markets (e.g., GE). On the other end of the continuum is the house-of-
brands strategy where the firm uses different brands to serve different markets (e.g., P&G). The 
trade-off between the two marketing strategies is economies of scale in marketing spending 
versus the customization of brands specific to segments (cf. Rao, Agarwal and Dahlhoff 2004). 
Better targeting enables firms to capture higher revenues by brand differentiation. If the firm 
implements a corporate branding strategy, then it will achieve economies of scale in marketing 
spending. Smith and Park (1992) find that extended brands have lower advertising-to-sales ratio 
than individual brands. If the firm implements a house-of-brands strategy, then it is able to target 
and position each brand to the specific needs of the segments. Morgan and Rego (2006) report a 
positive association between number of brands in a portfolio and market share. In the context of 
a merger and acquisition, a target firm’s brand strategy will provide one of two benefits that will 
affect future cash flows of the brand portfolio. For example, Rao, Agarwal and Dahlhoff (2004) 
find that corporate branding strategy has a greater positive effect on Tobin’s q than a house-of-
brands strategy. Thus, target firm brand portfolio strategy will affect acquirer’s cash flow 
expectations from target’s brand(s).      
The second premise is that a firm’s choice of brand strategy reflects its preference for 
economies of scale over differentiation benefit or visa versa. For example, firms that implement 
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 a corporate branding strategy have significantly lower advertising-to-sales ratio than firms 
implementing a house-of-brands strategy (Rao, Agarwal and Dahlhoff 2004). Firms go to the 
extent of restructuring their brand portfolios to achieve differentiation or economies of scale 
benefits. For example, in the early 1990s, Colgate-Palmolive reduced its brand portfolio size by a 
quarter, which led to savings of $20 million a year (Knudsen, Finskud, Tornblom and Hogna 
1997). In the context of mergers and acquisitions, acquirers are likely to reflect heterogeneity in 
brand strategies. The acquirer firm will restructure a target firm’s brand portfolio following the 
transaction depending on its preference for economies of scale or differentiation benefit. In fact, 
empirical evidence suggests that target firms’ assets undergo substantial restructuring in the post-
merger and acquisition period (e.g., Capron, Mitchell and Swaminathan 2001). Restructuring of 
the brand portfolio will affect the value of the brand portfolio. 
In the following section, we present the conceptual model based on the premises from the 
RBV and brand strategy literatures. Then, we introduce the moderators and their impact on a 
subset of the proposed main effects. 
Marketing Capabilities 
Target’s marketing capability.  A target’s marketing capability refers to the firm’s ability 
to combine efficiently a number of marketing resources to engage in productive activity and 
attain marketing objectives (Amit and Schoemaker 1993; Dutta, Narasimhan and Rajiv 2005). 
Traditionally, marketing objectives have been customer satisfaction, market share or sales. 
However, achieving these objectives may be costly. In fact, firms are increasingly interested in 
productivity of marketing investments (Rust, Ambler, Carpenter, Kumar, and Srivastava  2004). 
If revenues are highly dependent on substantial marketing spending, then the margins on these 
brands will be low. Thus, a critical metric for the acquirer firm is the outputs (revenue) generated 
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 by marketing inputs (advertising, promotion).  Target firms with strong marketing capabilities 
are likely to achieve financial outcomes more efficiently than firms with weaker marketing 
capabilities. Empirical findings suggest that stronger marketing capabilities lead to higher 
profitability (Dutta, Narasimhan and Rajiv 1999), which implies that firms with stronger 
capabilities do achieve efficiency in marketing spending. This efficiency will affect an acquirer’s 
cash flow expectations from the brand portfolio. If the brand portfolio is very productive with 
respect to marketing spending, then it implies that the acquirer firm will be able to generate 
higher revenues from the target’s brand portfolio with lower marketing spending. Consequently, 
we expect that: 
H1: The higher the target firm’s marketing capability, the higher the target  
                   firm’s brand portfolio value. 
 
Acquirer’s marketing capability. Acquirer’s marketing capability refers to a firm’s ability 
to combine efficiently a number of marketing resources to engage in productive activity and 
attain marketing objectives (Amit and Schoemaker 1993; Dutta, Narasimhan and Rajiv 2005). 
Acquirers vary in terms of their marketing resources (e.g., brands, customer relationships and 
sales personnel). The differences in marketing resources create differences among acquirers’ 
marketing capabilities (cf. Makadok 2001). Empirical findings corroborate this argument: there 
is heterogeneity across firms’ marketing capabilities even among the firms in the same industry 
(Dutta, Narasimhan and Rajiv 1999). Firms with stronger marketing capabilities will attribute 
higher value to a target’s brands because their expectations of future revenues from a brand 
portfolio will be higher than firms with lower marketing capabilities. This stems from the fact 
that acquirers with stronger marketing capabilities will be able to deploy a target’s brand 
portfolio more effectively and efficiently. More specifically, “marketing competent” acquirers 
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 may leverage a target’s brands successfully in following ways: (i) achieve same or higher level 
revenues by spending fewer marketing dollars, (ii) extend the target’s brands to new markets 
more efficiently and (iii) co-brand the target’s brands with existing brands more efficiently.  
Being aware of the strength to execute these possibilities, an acquirer’s cash flow expectations 
from a target’s brand portfolio will be higher.  Formally, 
H2: The higher the acquirer’s marketing capability, the higher the target    
        firm’s  brand portfolio value. 
 
Brand Portfolio Strategy 
Target firm brand portfolio diversity. Brand portfolio diversity is defined as the degree to 
which a firm chooses to serve markets with different brands. If a firm uses one brand name 
across industries (e.g., GE) then the diversity is low. If the firm uses different brand names 
across its businesses then the diversity is high (e.g., P&G). Portfolio diversity is a continuum 
whose one end is corporate branding strategy and the other end is a house-of-brands strategy. 
The choice of portfolio diversity has performance implications. If the firm chooses to have a less 
diverse brand portfolio, then the firm can achieve economies of scale in marketing investments 
(cf. Rao, Agarwal and Dahlhoff 2004). Diverse brand portfolios are likely to require more 
marketing spending than less diverse portfolios because each brand will require a distinct 
marketing program due to different brand images. In fact, Smith and Park (1992) find that brand 
extensions lead to advertising efficiency, which suggests that having fewer brands in the 
portfolio increases economies of scale in marketing spending.  
Three risks, however, are associated with having less diverse brand portfolios. First, 
having few brands per category imposes the risk of ignoring some segments of the market which 
will reduce the revenues from the overlooked segments. Second, the risk of brand dilution or 
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 brand identity increases as the firm extends the brand to different businesses because established 
brand associations and certain product categories may not fit (Keller 1993). Third, failure of the 
brand in one category could have a negative spillover effect in other categories where the brand 
is used (John, Loken and Joiner 1998; Loken and John 1993). 
Empirical evidence on the net performance effects of these strategies is sparse. Rao, 
Agarwal and Dahlhoff (2004) find that corporate branding strategy has a higher positive effect 
on Tobin’s q than a house-of-brands strategy. In favor of less diverse brand portfolios, Smith and 
Park (1992) report that brand extensions are associated with higher market shares compared to 
individual brands. Also, Morgan and Rego (2006) find that the number of brands in a portfolio is 
negatively associated with cash flows.   
In the context of merger and acquisitions, we argue that acquirers will attribute higher 
value to brands when the target’s brand portfolio diversity is low for the following reasons. First, 
firms are challenged with high costs of maintaining many brands independent of a merger and 
acquisition (Laforet and Saunders 2005). Following a merger and acquisition, the acquirer firm 
usually incurs large integration and restructuring costs (Larsson and Finkelstein 1999). Under 
such conditions, managers will be more sensitive to costs of maintaining different brands and 
attribute lower value to diverse brand portfolios.  
Second, if the target has fewer (or perhaps one) brands, then it is easier for the acquirer to 
communicate the strengths of the brand(s) to customers and investment community compared to 
a large portfolio of brands. Different brands have distinct identities and perhaps they are targeted 
at different segments. For example, Nike conveys one image across products with a single brand 
(Keller 2003) and P&G has distinct images for the brands in its portfolio. Communicating the 
different images of a diverse brand portfolio to consumers and investors should be more difficult 
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 than communicating single image to same audience. In fact, Rao, Agarwal and Dahlhoff(2004) 
conclude that investors may not be able to see the benefits of brand differentiation. Thus, 
acquirers will attribute lower value to diverse brand portfolios. 
H3: The higher the target firm’s brand portfolio diversity, the lower the  
       target firm’s brand portfolio value. 
 
 
Acquirer firm portfolio diversity. Acquirer portfolio diversity is defined as the degree to 
which the acquirer chooses to serve markets with different brands. An acquirer’s branding 
strategy reflects its approach to branding. For example, if the acquirer’s portfolio diversity is 
high, then the firm prefers differentiation benefits by serving various markets with multiple 
brands to achieving economies of scale with fewer brands. If the acquirer’s brand portfolio 
diversity is low, it is likely that the acquirer will keep only a few of the target’s brands because 
keeping more of the target’s brands will lead to inefficiency in marketing spending. Empirical 
findings suggest that the target’s assets are more likely to be divested than acquirer’s assets 
following a transaction (Capron, Mitchell and Swaminathan 2001). Brands are subject to 
divestiture along with other assets. For example, following the merger between AT&T and SBC, 
AT&T which has low portfolio diversity, has recently decided to abandon the Cingular brand 
and logo as early as 2007 (Advertising Age, May 2006). Empirical and anecdotal evidence 
indicate that the acquirer is likely to keep few, if any, of the target’s brands alive when the 
acquirer’s portfolio diversity is low. Less number of brands will lead to lower brand portfolio 
value. 
H4: The higher the acquirer’s brand portfolio diversity, the higher the target  
        firm’s brand portfolio value. 
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 Deal Type: Horizontal vs. Other Type of Mergers and Acquisitions  
A merger and acquisition is defined as a horizontal deal when the target and acquirer 
operate in the same industry. If the acquirer and the target firm operate in the same industry, two 
dynamics emerge that could affect the functioning of the main effects: (i) redundancy (ii) 
information asymmetry.  
Varadarajan, DeFanti, and Busch (2006) allude to the importance of deal type in creating 
redundancies among acquirer’s and target’s brands. When the acquirer and target operate in the 
same industry, redundancies among the target and the acquirer brand portfolios will be higher 
than when they operate in different industries. Redundancy is likely to affect the acquirer’s 
divestment behavior following the merger and acquisition.  
The RBV literature emphasizes the significance of firm abilities in determining the value 
of strategic factors. In fact, Barney (1986) concludes that the only way firms could gain 
competitive advantage is via internal analysis of their capabilities. The underlying logic for the 
argument is that capabilities are complex in nature and difficult to understand. In context of a 
merger and acquisition, the acquirer’s ability to assess the target firm’s marketing capabilities 
will depend on its understanding of the target firm. 
Horizontal M&A and acquirer firm brand portfolio diversity. When the acquirer and the 
target operate in the same industry, the redundancy between the acquirer and target’s brands will 
be greater (cf. Varadarajan, DeFanti and Busch 2006). Acquirers with more diverse brand 
portfolios will suffer more from redundancy compared to acquirers with less diverse brand 
portfolios because firms with more diverse brand portfolios will have more brands targeted at 
different consumer segments within the same industry. The likelihood of overlap among 
acquirer’s and target’s brands will be higher and the acquirer’s propensity to retain as many 
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 target’s brands will be lower. For example, P&G decided to divest Gillette’s Right Guard, Soft 
and Dri and Dry Ideas brands in the deodorant category even though P&G has a highly diverse 
brand portfolio. Thus,  
H5: The effect of the acquirer’s portfolio diversity on target firm’s brand  
        value will be lower when the deal is horizontal.  
 
Horizontal M&A and target firm’s marketing capability. Marketing capabilities are tacit 
in nature as a result of the complex skills and processes involved in building them (Day 1994). It 
is not easy for a firm’s competitors or potential acquirers to assess the strength of a firm’s 
marketing capabilities. Sometimes it is even difficult for a firm’s executives to comprehend 
different facets of a firm’s marketing capability (Dierickx and Cool 1989). If the acquirer and 
target operate in different industries, then it is more difficult for the acquirer to assess the 
marketing capabilities of the target. Although performance outcomes of targets are visible to all 
acquirers, acquirers that operate in the same industry as the target are likely to have more 
information on the marketing organization, personnel and other determinants of the target’s 
performance than “outsider” acquirers. Thus, insider acquirers will have a more accurate 
assessment of target’s marketing capabilities.  More accuracy, however, may inflate or deflate an 
acquirer’s assessment of a target’s marketing capability. Thus, we pose two competing 
hypotheses.  Formally, 
H6a: The effect of the target firm’s marketing capability on the target firm’s  
          brand portfolio value will be higher when the deal is horizontal  
 
H6b: The effect of the target firm’s marketing capability on the target firm  
          brand portfolio value will be lower when the deal is horizontal 
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 Target Firm Sales Growth 
Target firm sales growth & target firm marketing capability. Firms with stronger 
marketing capabilities are more efficient in deploying marketing resources, which in turn lead to 
higher profitability (Dutta, Narasimhan and Rajiv 1999). Such firms are attractive acquisition 
candidates. However, acquirer firms may not always focus on efficiency of target firms for two 
reasons. First, marketing executives tend to focus on top-line metrics, such as sales and market 
share, rather than profitability (Armstrong and Collopy 1996). If the target achieves a high level 
of sales growth, then managers may pay less attention to efficiency in generating the sales 
growth. Consequently, the impact of the target’s marketing capability on brand value will be 
lower when sales growth is high. Second, acquirers enter or exit markets based on growth 
prospects (e.g., Chang 1996). For example, Jones Apparel Group acquired Barneys New York 
“to enter the high-growth, resilient luxury goods market” (Jones Apparel Group 10-K 2006). 
When the acquirer’s fundamental objective is to capture the target firm’s growth opportunities, it 
will pay less attention to efficiency of growth. Thus, 
H7: The higher the target firm’s three-year-average sales growth, the lower  
        the effect of target firm’s marketing capability on the target firm’s   
        brand portfolio value.   
  
Control Variables 
Target Firm Industry Characteristics. Industry factors explain 9-10% of variability in 
firm performance (McGahan and Porter 2002). We incorporate five industry factors to control 
for industry effects. We include industry growth because firms enter and exit markets depending 
on the growth prospects (Reed and Luffman 1986). Cash flow expectations from brands may be 
higher in growth industries than in mature or declining industries. We also incorporate the 
demand risk and competition in the industry as controls. If the demand is highly volatile in an 
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 industry, then perceptions of risk associated with future cash flows will be high. Similarly, high 
levels of competition in an industry may increase the risk expectations associated with the future 
cash flows due to possibility of price competition, entry of new brands. High risk may have 
negative impact on brand value via higher discount rates.  
 We capture the nature of target firm’s industry by categorizing the industries on two 
different dimensions: products versus services and consumer versus business-to-business 
industries. Ambler, Bhattacharya, Edell, Keller, Lemon, and Mittal (2002) argue that brands may 
be less important in service-oriented industries than they are in product-oriented industries.  
Similarly, importance of brands may be different in industries where the customer is the end-
consumer than industries where the customer is a firm due to differences in decision-making and 
risks associated with the product (cf. Cannon and Perrault 1999).  
Target Firm Characteristics. Simon and Sullivan (1993) argue that market share should 
affect the cash flows of the brands so we incorporate market share as a control variable. 
Acquirer Firm Financial Reporting. Findings in the accounting literature indicate that 
firms may overestimate or underestimate the value of acquired intangible assets for financial 
reporting purposes (e.g., Wyatt 2005). Muller III(1999) discusses the potential impact of two 
factors on brand value reporting, namely leverage and financing considerations. First, firms with 
high leverage ratios adopt income increasing accounting practices (e.g., Christie 1990). 
Attribution of value to brands improves the leverage ratio which may help the firm in provision 
of long term debt from financial institutions. Second, firms that have to renegotiate their debt 
restructure may attempt at signaling stronger financial positions by recognizing acquired brands 
(Muller III 1999). Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms use brand valuations to support the 
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 raising of new loan capital (e.g., Jackson 1996). Thus, we incorporate acquirer leverage and 
financing considerations as control variables. 
Methodology 
Sample 
 The study sample includes all the mergers and acquisitions where targets and acquirers 
were U.S.-based public firms for the period 1998-2004. We focused on public firms because data 
for some of the independent variables (e.g., marketing capability) is only available for public 
companies. The sampling period starts at 1998 because detailed reporting of intangible assets in 
a merger and acquisition was voluntary prior to 2001. Consequently, few firms reported the 
breakdown of intangible assets following a transaction during 1998-2000 period which reduced 
the likelihood of firms reporting breakdown of intangible assets prior to 1998. This is reflected in 
the final sample as well. There are only eight cases where the transaction date is prior to 2001.  
 The final sample includes target and acquirer firms from a wide variety of two-digit SIC 
industries: 20, 23, 27, 28, 31, 33, 35, 42, 59, 73, 87. 30.54% of target firms operate in business 
services industry (SIC code 73). 10.68% of target firms operate in measurement instruments 
industry (SIC code 38). 25.19% of acquirer firms operate in business services industry (SIC code 
73) and 12.21% of acquirer firms operate in industrial, commercial machinery, computer 
equipment industry (SIC Code 35).  
Data 
 Data set was manually compiled from a combination of secondary sources such as U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, Compustat, SDC Platinum. After 
identifying the mergers and acquisitions where both targets and acquirers were U.S. based firms 
and public companies, we searched U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings of 
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 all the acquirers individually and identified the firms that recognized the financial value of 
target’s brand(s) on their balance sheet.  
 We collected data from Compustat, Advertising Age and updated NBER Database to 
measure marketing capability variable. Compustat was used to obtain sales, advertising, selling 
and general administrative expenses, receivables and sub-market segmentation data. We checked 
Advertising Age to validate whether firms in the sample incurred advertising expenses but did 
not report it. We used the updated NBER patent citation database compiled by Dr. Bronwyn H. 
Hall at the University of California Berkeley.  
 We used the U.S. Patent and Trademark database to collect the data on the target and the 
acquirer’s brands. We searched all the brands registered in the firm’s name. We did not include 
the brands in the portfolio if the brand was abandoned before the effective data of the 
transaction. Also, we did not include the brands in firms that were registered after the effective 
date of the transaction. 
We obtained data on industry concentration, industry demand growth, target firm’s 
market share, target firm’s sales growth, industry type (direct-to-consumer vs. business-to-
business; products vs. services), acquirer leverage, acquirer financing consideration, acquirer 
value creation, acquirer value appropriation emphasis, and acquirer firm size from Compustat.   
Measures 
Measure of Dependent Variable 
We use the dollar value of the target brand portfolio that acquirer firms report in their 
SEC filing associated with a merger and acquisition transaction. We divide brand value by firm 
value to control for target firm size. Firm value is the total purchase price that the acquirer firm 
pays for the target firm. 
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 Measures of Independent Variables 
Relative marketing capability. We use stochastic frontier estimation (SFE) to measure 
marketing capability (Dutta, Narasimhan and Rajiv 1999, 2005). This operationalization is 
analogous to the concept of “production frontier” in economics (Kumbhakar 1987). There are 
inputs and there is an output associated with these inputs. For example, “sales” is an output that 
the firms would try to maximize. Inputs to achieve sales are advertising, other marketing 
investments and technology. We compute the firm’s distance from the efficient frontier of sales 
given advertising, other marketing expenditures and technology. We use the three-year average 
of relative marketing capability scores in the estimation. 
Following DNR(1999), we estimate following function for each four-digit SIC industry 
to compute a marketing efficiency for a firm in year t2. We use two lags of advertising and SGA 
spending because prior literature suggests that impact of advertising and other marketing 
spending depreciates rapidly (Simon and Sullivan 1993). In the literature, little guidance exists 
on the lag structure of patent citation in a model where the dependent variable is sales. Patent 
citations are closer to market performance of the products than research and development 
expenditures in the process of technology development (cf. Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2005). 
Research and development expenditures may not necessarily result in innovative output due to 
uncertainty associated with technology development process. Prior empirical studies use up to 
six lags of the research and development expenditures (Erickson and Jacobson 1992). Given the 
closeness of the patenting to performance in sequence of technology development, we use up to 
three lags of weighted patent citations in estimation: 
 
                                                 
2 We use Equation (1) in stochastic frontier estimation. However, there are no registered patents for the firms 
operating in following SIC codes: 5130, 5600, 5621, 5900, 5945, 6531, 7381, 8741 which required to drop 
technology variable in the estimation or to use only contemporaneous zero values of technology. 
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 Ln (Salesit) = α0 + Σ α1 * Sub_Marketit + α2 * [β1* ln(Adit) + β2*ln(Adit-1) + β2*ln(Adt-2)]  
            + α3 * [β3 * ln(Marketing Spendingt) + β4 *  ln(Marketing Spendingt-1)   
+ β5 * ln(Marketing Spendingt-2)] + α4 * [β6 * ln(Techbaseit)+  
+ β7 * ln(Techbasei(t-1))+ β8 * ln(Techbasei(t-2))+ β9 * ln(Techbasei(t-3))]+  
+ α5 *ln(Receivablesit)+ α6 *ln(Installedbasei(t-1))+ νit - uit                                 (1) 
 
Sub_Marketit  : 1 if the firm is operating in a NAICS category within a SIC.  
: 0 otherwise 
Adit   : Advertising spending of firm i year t 
Marketing Spendingit : SGA expense of firm i in year t   
Techbaseit  : Weighted number of citations firm’s patents received in year t    
Receivablesit  : Receivables on the balance sheet for firm i in year t 
Installedbaseit  : Lagged values of sales  
νit   : Random error component  
uit   : Error component accounting for firm specific inefficiency  
 
We compute the technical efficiency score using the parameter estimates of equation (1) 
(Appendix A). Then we divide this score by the industry maximum score and multiply it by 100 
for each year.  
There are two minor differences between the estimation we use and that of DNR (1999). 
First, DNR (1999) use trade press reports and two independent experts to measure within-
industry segments. We use NAICS classification system to measure within industry competition. 
NAICS scheme slices four-digit SIC codes into finer subcategories which allows us to account 
for the within-industry competition alluded to by DNR (1999). Second, DNR (1999) use Koyck-
lag structure to compute stock values of technology base, advertising, marketing spending and 
installed base, and then insert these values into stochastic frontier estimation. Instead of 
estimating the Koyck-lag model separately, we estimate the coefficients of lagged values of these 
four variables simultaneously in SFE. This approach is conceptually similar to Koyck 
specification, but it does not require assuming an apriori decay parameter in estimation. 
Brand portfolio diversity. We use a measure of brand portfolio diversity that is 
conceptually similar to Rao, Agarwal and Dahlhoff (2004). Specifically, brand portfolio diversity 
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 is portfolio size divided by the number of categories in which a firm operates. Portfolio size is 
measured as the number of brands that a firm owns. The number of categories is computed as the 
number of different NAICS categories in which the firm operates. For example, if the firm 
implements a pure corporate branding strategy, then the portfolio size is equal to one. If the firm 
is operating in five different NAICS categories then the brand portfolio diversity is equal to 0.2 
(i.e., 1/5). As this ratio approaches to zero, it suggests that the firm’s brand is extended into many 
different categories. If the ratio increases, then it suggests that firm’s strategy is closer to a 
house-of-brands strategy.   
Deal type. We categorize type of deal as horizontal if the target and acquirer’s primary 
SIC codes are the same. We code the dummy variable as one if the target and acquirer operate in 
the same industry, and zero otherwise. 
Target firm sales growth. We compute the year-over-year sales growth of target firm in 
primary SIC industry for the three years preceding the transaction. Then we compute the average 
of three year-over-year sales growth rates to arrive at target firm sales growth. 
                         Target firm sales growth =                                         (2) − − − − −
=
−∑3 ( ) ( 1) ( 1)
1
( ( ) / ) / 3i t k i t k i t k
k
fs fs fs
              where, fsit  refers to the target firm sales in industry i at time t.  
Control Variables 
Target firm market share. We divide target firm’s sales by the total sales in the primary 
SIC industry for each year preceding the transaction. Then I compute the average market share 
for the three-year period before the transaction. 
                       Market Sharei = (Market Shareit-1 + Market Shareit-2 + Market Shareit-3)/3           (3)  
             where i refers to the target firm and t refers to the transaction year 
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 Target industry demand risk. In economics and finance, standard deviation of a time 
series, i.e. stock prices, is used as a measure of risk (Eraker 2004; Kose, Prasad, and Terrones 
2005). We follow this convention and compute the standard deviation of target firm’s primary 
industry sales over the three years preceding the merger and acquisition to measure industry risk. 
We divide the standard deviation by the mean industry sales to correct for the size effects.   
                              Target Industry Demand Risk = 
−
=
−
=
−∑
∑
3
1/ 2
( )
1
3
( )
1
( ( ))
( ) / 3
i i t k
k
i t k
k
S s
s
                                           (4) 
       where,  
       S-bar is the mean industry sales during the three years prior to transaction 
       si refers to the total industry sales in industry i 
       t refers to the transaction year. 
 
Target industry growth. We compute the three-year average of the year-over-year sales 
growth rate in the target’s primary SIC code. This measure controls for the growth trend in 
target’s industry. 
                               Target industry  growth =                              (5)  − − − − −
=
−∑3 ( ) ( 1) ( 1)
1
( ( )/ )/3i t k i t k i t k
k
s s s
                where, sit  refers to the total industry sales in industry i at time t. 
 
Target industry competition. A three-firm industry concentration measure is used to 
capture competition in the industry. We sum the market shares of three leading firms in the target 
firm’s primary SIC code (Clark 1984; Sharma and Kesner 1996). 
Time. We use a time dummy to control for two reasons. First, FASB regulation on 
reporting of intangible assets in merger and acquisition transactions came into effect in 2001. 
Second, time dummy controls for general macroeconomic conditions at the time of transaction.  
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 Products vs. services. We classify the target firm’s primary industry as product vs. 
service industries. We code SIC codes starting with numbers greater than four as service 
industries and others as product industries. 
Direct-to-consumer vs. business-to-business. We classify the target firm’s primary 
industries into two groups based on the customers of these industries. If an industry primarily 
sells to end consumers it is coded as one and zero otherwise.  
Acquirer leverage. The leverage is measured as the long term debt one year prior to the 
transaction divided by total assets one year prior to the transaction (Muller III 1999).  
Acquirer financing considerations. Financing considerations of the acquirer is measured 
as debt due in one year divided by total assets one year prior to the transaction (Muller III 1999). 
Acquirer value appropriation. Value appropriation is measured as acquirer’s advertising 
spending one year prior to the effective date of the merger and acquisition divided by the 
acquirer’s sales one year prior to the transaction (Mizik and Jacobson 2003).  
Acquirer value creation. Value creation is measured as the acquirer’s R&D spending one 
year prior to the merger and acquisition divided by the acquirer’s sales one year prior to the 
transaction (Mizik and Jacobson 2003). 
Acquirer Firm Size. Firm size is measured as the number of employees one year prior to 
the transaction. 
Model Specification and Estimation 
 The dependent variable, brand value divided by firm value, is truncated zero and one. 
The truncation of the dependent variable violates the OLS estimator assumption that the 
dependent variable is a continuous normal variable. Therefore, we use a Tobit estimator to test 
the model.  
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 In analyzing the moderator effects, we include interaction terms hierarchically.  
Base Model: No Interaction Terms 
Log (Brand Value/Firm Value) =   β0 + β1* TMC + β2* AMC + β3* TPD + β4* APD +   
        β5*TYPE + β6*TGR + β7*TMS + β8* COMP +   
        β9* IGR + β10* IDR + β11*TIME +  
        β12*SERVICES + β13* CONSUMER+ ε                      (6) 
       
   
 
 
Model with Interactions 
Log (Brand Value/Firm Value) =  β0 + β1* TMC + β2*AMC +  β3*TPD + Β4*APD +   
                                                       β5*TYPE +β6*TGR + β7* (TMC*TYPE) + 
       β8* (APL*TYPE) + β9* (TMC*FGR) +  
       β10* TMS + β11* COMP + β12* IGR + β13* IDR +        
       β14*TIME + β15* SERVICES + β16*CONSUMER +                                          
           β17*LEVERAGE + β18*FINANCE + ε                                 (7) 
where: 
TMC       : Target Marketing Capability          
AMC       : Acquirer Marketing Capability      
TPD       : Target Portfolio Diversity 
APD       : Acquirer Portfolio Diversity 
TYPE       : Whether or not the deal is horizontal  
TGR       : Target Firm Sales Growth 
TMS       : Target Firm Market Share 
COMP       : Target Industry Concentration 
IGR       : Target Industry Sales Growth 
IDR       : Target Industry Sales Volatility 
TIME                             : 1 if before 2001, 0 otherwise 
SERVICES      : Products vs. Services 
CONSUMER      : Direct-to-Consumer vs. Business-to-Business 
LEVERAGE      : Acquirer Leverage  
FINANCE      : Acquirer Financing Considerations 
 
Robustness Test 
The factors that affect acquirer firm’s decision to recognize the target firm’s brand value 
may be different than the factors that affect how much value the acquirer attributes to target 
firm’s brands. We specify a Heckman selection model to test the robustness of the findings from 
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 Tobit analysis. This requires first step model specification for the choice of brand value 
recognition. Muller III (1999) argues that firm’s leverage ratio, financing considerations and firm 
size affect their decision to recognize the brand value.  
Strategic emphasis of the firm may affect the choice of brand value recognition. Strategic 
emphasis is defined as the relative emphasis a firm places on value appropriation compared to 
value creation (Mizik and Jacobson 2003). Mizik and Jacobson (2003) argue that strategic 
emphasis of the firm determines the fundamental resource allocation decisions. According to 
authors, firms with value creation emphasis tend to invest in technology. Such a firm is less 
likely to recognize the brand value of a target firm compared to a firm whose emphasis is on 
value appropriation because they will focus on target’s technology assets rather than marketing 
assets.  
Finally, we include a time dummy to control for the change in accounting regulation for 
the recognition of intangible assets on balance sheet as a result of a merger and acquisition.  
Brand Value Recognition           = β0  + β1* LEVERAGE + β2*FINANCE +  β3*ADVINT   
+ β4*RDINT + β5*SIZE  + β6*TIME + ε                    (8) 
 
where: 
BRAND VALUE RECOGNITION : 1 if acquirer firm attributes value to target  
    firm’s brands, 0 otherwise 
LEVERAGE        : Acquirer Firm Leverage Ratio 
FINANCE        : Acquirer Firm Financing Considerations 
ADVINT        : Acquirer Firm Value Appropriation 
RDINT        : Acquirer Firm Value Creation 
SIZE         : Acquirer Firm Size 
TIME                               : 1 if before 2001, 0 otherwise 
We follow the procedure introduced by Heckman (1979) to estimate the system of 
equations. We use a probit model to estimate equation (8). Inverse Mills’ ratio is computed using 
the parameter estimates of equation (8) (Appendix B). Then, we augment equation (2) with 
inverse Mills’ ratio to control for the sample selection.  
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 Preliminary Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
We start by exploring the magnitude of target firm’s brand value in mergers and 
acquisitions. When we compare the value of brands to major intangible assets, we observe 
patterns that conform to extant perspectives on relative significance of these assets (Table 3). 
Mean comparison test of customer relationship value to brand value ratio between business-to-
business and direct-to-consumer groups suggests that customer relationship value to brand value 
ratio is greater in business-to-business than it is in direct-to-consumer industries at 95% 
confidence level. There is a similar pattern in brand value to technology value ratio. Mean 
comparison test of technology value to brand value ratio between business-to-business and 
direct-to-consumer groups suggests that technology assets value to brand value ratio is greater in 
business-to-business than it is in direct-to-consumer industries at 99% confidence level. 
On average, brands account for 9.8% of the value of the transaction (Table 4). When we 
consider the magnitude of these transactions (mean transaction value is $1.8 billion), we observe 
that brands account for substantial value of a firm. These descriptive statistics underscore the 
significance of brands in creation of financial value.  
Preliminary Estimation Results 
We estimate the equations (6) and (7) using a Tobit estimator (Table 7). The likelihood 
ratio suggests that model with interactions leads to a significant increase in the model fit (χ2 
d.f.=3, p<0.01). Overall results indicate that both target and acquirer characteristics are important 
determinants of financial value of target firm’s brands in a merger and acquisition.  
Marketing capabilities. We find support for H1 (β1=0.014, p<0.1). A target’s marketing 
capability has a positive effect on the target’s brand value. Significance of this finding is 
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 compounded by the fact that we control for market share. It is not enough just to pursue market 
share, firms need to be cognizant of cost-benefit ratio of marketing investments with respect to 
their competitors if they are interested in increasing the value of their brands in a merger and 
acquisition.   
We do not find support for H2 (β2=-0.003, p=0.66).  Enhancing the cash flows of brands 
is not easy. Brand repositioning or brand extensions can be risky. Acquirer firms may expect that 
the additional costs of improving a brand’s profitability to be too high. Consumers may have 
already established brand associations and repositioning a brand may be far more difficult than 
creating a new brand. Altering these associations is likely to require substantial resources.  
Brand portfolio diversity. We do not find support for H3 (β3=0.003, p=0.20). A target’s 
brand portfolio diversity may not affect the acquirer’s value expectations because the acquirer 
has the flexibility to restructure the target’s brand portfolio. For example, if the target 
implements a corporate branding strategy and the acquirer does not value this strategy, it can 
redeploy its own brands in target’s markets.  
We find support for H4 (β4=0.032, p<0.01). Acquirer’s brand portfolio diversity has a 
positive effect on target’s brand value. Acquirers that are closer to a house-of-brands strategy 
will attribute higher value to the target’s brand portfolio. It corroborates the argument that 
acquirers with less diverse brand portfolios are more likely to divest more of the target’s brands.  
Deal type and acquirer firm portfolio diversity. We find support for H5 (β7=-0.027, 
p<0.1). When the target and the acquirer operate in the same industry, the impact of acquirer’s 
brand portfolio diversity on target’s brand value is lower. This result corroborates arguments on 
the impact of redundancy between target’s and acquirer’s brand portfolios on target’s brand 
value. When acquirer and target operate in the same industry, acquirers with diverse brand 
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 portfolios are more likely to divest more target firm’s brands compared to acquirers with less 
diverse brand portfolios due to redundancy between brand portfolios. 
Deal type and target’s marketing capability. We do not find support for H6 (β8=-0.007, 
p=0.60). Given the financial magnitude of merger and acquisition deals, the acquirers that 
operate in different industries than targets (outsider acquirers) collect as much as information on 
potential targets as acquirers that operate in the same industry as the target (insider acquirer). It is 
possible that outsider acquirers have access to information on advertising and other marketing 
activities of the targets from secondary sources or consulting firms (cf. Makadok and Barney 
2001). Thus, information asymmetry does not arise among outsider and insider acquirers. 
Target’s sales growth and target’s marketing capability. We find support for H7 (β9=-
0.022, p<0.01). When a target firm achieves high levels of sales growth, the impact of target’s 
marketing capability on target’s brand value is lower. This result suggests that target firms can 
charge higher prices for their brands in a merger and acquisition if they achieve sales growth 
without achieving efficiency in their marketing spending. The moderating effect of sales growth 
may stem from two sources. First, managers may be focusing on top line growth as opposed 
profitability as some experimental findings imply (Armstrong and Collopy 1996). Second, firms 
may be putting a premium on growth as some managerial surveys suggest (Graham et al. 2005). 
Robustness Test 
 The reasons that drive firms to recognize brand value may be different than the factors 
that drive them to attribute more value brands in a merger and acquisition. We estimate a 
Heckman selection model in order to test this possibility. Sample selection equation is estimated 
and Inverse Mills’ ratio is included in the main model (Table 8). Results indicate that sample 
selection correction does not change the results pertaining to the parameter estimates of proposed 
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 relationships. For example coefficient of target marketing capability is positive and significant in 
Tobit and Heckman models ( Tobit: β1=0.014, p<0.1, Heckman: β1=0.012, p<0.1). The 
consistency of parameter estimates in different technique increases the validity of the results. 
Discussion 
Preliminary Implications 
Preliminary results indicate that values of brands are determined by both the target and 
acquirer characteristics in the context of mergers and acquisitions. Two factors emerge as the 
determinants of the target’s brand value, namely target’s marketing capability and acquirer’s 
brand portfolio diversity. We find that the target’s marketing capability has a positive effect on 
target’s brand value. Our conceptualization and measurement of marketing capability focuses on 
the efficiency of marketing investments. Thus, it is important for target firms to be cognizant of 
marketing dollars they spend to generate sales or acquire market share. If they do not achieve 
efficiency in marketing investments, they may fail to recover a good value for their brands in a 
merger and acquisition deal. However, there is a caveat, since the impact of marketing efficiency 
is lower when the target achieves high level of sales growth. Thus, sales growth may help 
overcome some of the marketing inefficiencies of the target firm.  
 Target firms need to be cognizant of the acquirer’s brand portfolio strategy in a merger 
and acquisition. Acquirers with diverse brand portfolios (i.e. firms that are closer to house-of-
brands strategy) are likely to value their brand portfolios higher than acquirers with less diverse 
brand portfolios. Thus, targets may seek acquirers with such branding strategies to obtain higher 
value for their brand portfolios. This finding is conditional on deal type. If the acquirer and the 
target operate in the same industry, the impact of acquirer portfolio differentiation on target’s 
brand value will be lower. Redundancy between the acquirer and the target’s brand portfolio is 
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 likely to lead to divestment of some of the target’s brands even if the acquirer prefers having 
many brands per business. 
 
Limitations & Future Research Directions 
A limitation of the study is that it relies on cross-sectional data. We do not observe the 
change in value of brands over time. The journey of Snapple brand from Quaker Oats to Triarc 
Beverage and finally to Cadburry Schwepps is a great example of the change in value of a brand. 
Future research can examine the change in the financial value of brands over time. 
 We examine the impact of acquirer characteristics on target firm’s brand value across 
transactions. Therefore, the sample does not contain information on potential buyers’ 
expectations from the same brand. If data were available on potential buyers’ bids for a target 
firm’s brand portfolio, then it would be possible to examine the factors that lead to differential 
value expectations from the same brand among potential buyers. 
 Future research can examine the impact of accumulation of different intangible assets, 
namely brands, customer relationships and technology on financial value and analyst 
expectations. Accounting literature provides some insights into main effects of intangible assets 
on analyst forecasts (e.g., Amir, Lev and Saugiannis 2003). However, contingency factors, such 
as corporate branding strategy or strategic emphasis of the firm, may moderate the relationship 
between brand value and analyst forecasts. Such work would enhance our understanding of the 
relationship among market-based assets, financial value and Wall Street expectations. 
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Table 1. Illustrative Transactions and Brand Portfolio Value 
Acquirer Target 
Target Firm 
Value 
(in millions) 
Target Firm 
Brand Value 
(in millions) 
Brand 
Value/Firm 
Value 
Constellation 
Brands 
 
Robert Mondavi 
 
1,042 186 17.85 % 
Cisco Systems 
Latitude 
Communications 
 
86 1 1.16% 
Checkers-Drive 
in Restaurants 
Rallys 
Hamburgers 40 19 49.72% 
 
Manpower Inc. 
 
Right 
Management 
Consultants 
630.6 191.3 30.30 % 
 
Sybase 
 
Avantgo 40.5 3.1 7.60 % 
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Table 2. Positioning of the Paper 
 
 Within a Firm In a Merger and Acquisition 
  
Farquhar and Ijiri (1991) 
Shocker and Weitz (1988) 
 
Mahajan, Rao and Srivastava(1994) 
THIS STUDY 
Conceptual 
Literature on the 
Determinants 
            Of 
    Financial 
Brand Value 
 
Empirical 
Literature on the 
Determinants  
              of  
Financial  
Brand Value 
 
 
 
Simon and Sullivan(1993) 
 
 
THIS STUDY 
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 Table 3. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Measure1
Brand Value The incremental cash flows which accrue to 
branded products over and above the cash flows 
which would result from sale of unbranded 
products (Simon and Sullivan 1993) 
 
Dollar value of target firm’s 
brand(s) reported by the 
acquirer firm 
Marketing Capability The extent to which firm is able to combine 
efficiently a number of marketing resources to 
engage in productive activity and attain 
marketing objectives (Dutta, Narasimhan and 
Rajiv 2005)  
 
Technical efficiency score 
from stochastic frontier 
estimation (Dutta, 
Narasimhan and Rajiv 1999, 
2005). See Appendix A for 
details. 
 
Brand Portfolio Diversity 
 
The extent to which firm prefers stand-alone 
brands to serve markets. 
 
Number of Brandsit / Number 
of Categoriesit
Deal Type Whether or not the deal is horizontal type. Coded 1 if target and acquirer 
firm operate in the same four-
digit SIC code, 0 otherwise 
 
Target Firm Sales Growth 
 
The extent to which target firm grows. The average of three year-
over-year target firm sales 
growth rates in primary four-
digit SIC industry during 3 
years prior to transaction. 
  
Target Firm Market Share  Target firm’s average market 
share during three-year period 
prior to deal 
  
Target Industry Demand 
Growth 
The extent to which demand in target firm’s 
industry grows. 
The average of three year-
over-year sales growth rates 
in target firm’s primary four-
digit SIC code during 3 years 
prior to transaction. 
 
Target Industry Demand 
Risk 
The extent to which demand in target firm’s 
industry is volatile. 
Coefficient of variation of 
sales in target firm’s primary 
four-digit SIC code. 
 
Average of sum of top three 
market shares in target firm’s 
primary four-digit SIC code 
during 3 years prior to 
transaction. 
Target Industry Competition The extent to which there is competition in 
target firm’s industry (Sharma and Kesner 
1996) 
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Table 3 (Continued). Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Measure1
Time Whether or not deal date is prior to 2001 
 
1 if deal is prior to 2001, 0 
otherwise 
 
Services The extent to which target firm’s industry is 
product vs. service oriented. 
1 if target firm’s primary four-
digit SIC code start with 5-9, 0 
otherwise 
 
Consumer The extent to which target firm’s industry 
sells to end consumers vs. businesses. 
1 if target firm’s primary four-
digit SIC code sells to end 
consumers, 0 otherwise 
 
Acquirer Leverage The extent to which firm is able to finance 
its long term debt (Muller III 1999) 
 
Long Term Debtit-1 / Total 
Assetsit-1
Acquirer Financing Consideration The extent to which the firm needs to raise 
capital in the short term ((Muller III 1999) 
 
Short Term Debtit-1/Total 
Assetsit-1
Acquirer Value Appropriation 
Emphasis2
The extent to which the firm emphasizes 
value appropriation as a strategy (Mizik and 
Jacobson 2003) 
 
Advertising Spendingit-1 / 
Salesit-1
Acquirer Value Creation Emphasis2 The extent to which the firm emphasizes 
value creation as a strategy (Mizik and 
Jacobson 2003) 
R&D Spendingit-1 / Salesit-1
 
   
1  i refers to the firm and t refers to deal year. 
2  These variables are only used in the Heckman sample selection model. 
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 Table 4. Brand Value Compared to Customer Relationship and Technology Value 
 
Value Ratios Direct-to-Consumer Business-to-Business 
 
Customer Relationship Value / 
Brand Value1
 
 
MeanA=0.41 
Obs   =41 
 
MeanB = 8.51 
Obs    =90 
   
Technology / Brand Value2 MeanC = 0.90 MeanD = 11.46 
 Obs   = 41 
 
Obs   = 90 
1T-test of mean comparison suggests that MeanB   > MeanA at 95% confidence level  
2T-test of mean comparison suggests that MeanD   > MeanC at 99% confidence level  
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Observations Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
 
Brand Value Equation Sample 
     
Brand Value/ Firm Value 131 0.098 0.152 0.001 0.97 
Log(Brand Value/ Firm Value) 131 -3.453 1.705 -7.613 -0.031 
Target Marketing Capability 131 75.969 23.830 15.290 99.99 
Acquirer Marketing Capability 131 78.699 22.738 12.544 99.94 
Target Portfolio Diversity 131 5.598 7.196 0.25 54 
Acquirer Portfolio Diversity 131 8.679 16.669 0.00 127 
Deal Type 131 0.458 0.500 0 1 
Target Sales Growth 131 0.358 0.624 -0.269 2.929 
Target Market Share 131 0.045 0.116 0.001 0.728 
Target Industry Competition 131 0.618 0.200 0.249 0.969 
Target Industry Growth 131 0.032 0.285 -0.673 2.902 
Target Industry Demand Risk 131 0.129 0.161 0.008 1.230 
Time 131 0.046 0.210 0 1 
Products vs. Services 131 0.489 0.502 0 1 
Consumer vs. Business-to-Business 131 0.313 0.465 0 1 
Acquirer Leverage 131 0.151 0.175 0 0.837 
Acquirer Financing Consideration 131 0.016 0.034 0 0.235 
 
Selection Equation Sample 
     
Acquirer Leverage 250 0.157 0.176 0 0.996 
Acquirer Financing Consideration 250 0.015 0.031 0 0.212 
Acquirer Value Appropriation Emphasis 250 0.027 0.136 0 1.97 
Acquirer Value Creation Emphasis 250 0.596 6.231 0 97.912 
Acquirer Firm Size 250 15,886 35352 27 315,889 
Time 250 0.027 0.163 0 1 
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Table 6. Correlation Matrix (n=131) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1) Log(Brand Value/Firm Value) 1.00                
2) Target Marketing Capability 0.11 1.00               
3) Acquirer Marketing Capability 0.19 0.43 1.00              
4) Target Portfolio Diversity 0.18 0.13 0.17 1.00             
5) Acquirer Portfolio Diversity 0.14 -0.17 -0.10 0.01 1.00            
6) Deal Type -0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 1.00           
7) Target Sales Growth -0.16 -0.06 -0.12 -0.18 -0.08 0.05 1.00          
8) Target Market Share 0.19 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.07 -0.12 -0.15 1.00         
9) Target Industry Concentration 0.17 0.25 0.17 0.17 -0.09 -0.22 -0.15 0.38 1.00        
10) Target Industry Growth 0.05 -0.10 0.01 -0.10 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.20 -0.04 1.00       
11) Target Industry Demand Risk 0.18 0.06 0.19 0.17 0.01 -0.14 0.02 0.30 0.31 0.45 1.00      
12) Time 0.22 0.04 0.35 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.10 0.05 0.09 0.35 0.29 1.00     
13) Products vs. Services -0.12 -0.34 -0.32 -0.33 0.04 -0.01 0.29 -0.26 -0.31 -0.02 -0.22 -0.14 1.00    
14) Consumer vs. Business-to-business 0.51 0.13 0.35 0.18 -0.08 0.01 -0.12 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.16 -0.23 1.00   
15) Acquirer Leverage 0.30 0.22 0.30 -0.00 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.22 0.16 0.04 0.12 0.01 -0.19 0.40 1.00  
16) Acquirer Financing Consideration 0.26 0.10 0.17 0.12 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.26 0.25 -0.17 0.22 -0.08 -0.22 0.36 0.18 1.00 
 
 
 
 Table 7. Tobit Estimation Results 
 
DV: Log(Brand Value/Firm Value) No Interactions With Interactions 
Independent Variables Coefficient Std.Err. Coefficient Std.Err.
-5.124 0.745*** -5.997 0.953*** Intercept 
0.004 0.006 0.014 0.008* Target Marketing Capability 
Acquirer Marketing Capability -0.002 0.006 -0.003 0.007 
Target Portfolio Diversity 0.020 0.018 0.003 0.018 
Acquirer Portfolio Diversity 0.019 0.007*** 0.032 0.009*** 
Moderators     
Deal Type 0.021 0.247 0.846 0.997 
-0.256 0.205 1.360 0.571*** Target Sales Growth 
Interactions     
  -0.027 0.014* Deal Type * Acquirer Portfolio Diversity 
Deal Type * Target Marketing Capability   -0.007 0.012 
  -0.022 0.007*** Target Firm Sales Growth*Target Marketing 
Controls     
Target Market Share 0.125 1.256 -0.255 -0.255 
Target Industry Competition 0.489 0.703 0.357 0.674 
Target Industry Growth -0.229 0.562 -0.291 0.539 
Target Industry Demand Risk 0.689 1.036 0.632 0.994 
1.264 0.633** 1.310 0.606** Time 
0.421 0.288 0.508 0.281* Products vs. Services 
1.493 0.319*** 1.449 0.309*** Consumer vs. Business-to-business 
1.371 0.782** 1.838 0.766** Acquirer Leverage 
Acquirer Financing Consideration 4.248 4.093 3.713 3.930 
     
n 131 131 
Log Likelihood -224.714 -218.797 
Model χ2 (p-level) 0.000 0.000 
Likelihood Ratio Test χ2 (3)   11.83 
* p <0.1   
** p <0.05  
*** p <0.01 
 
 
0.008 
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 Table 8. Tobit and Heckman Selection Models 
DV: Log(Brand Value/Firm Value) Tobit Heckman 
Independent Variables Coefficient Std.Err. Coefficient Std.Err.
Intercept -5.997 0.953*** -4.499 1.263*** 
0.014 0.008* 0.013 0.007* Target Marketing Capability 
Acquirer Marketing Capability -0.003 0.007 -0.004 0.007 
Target Portfolio Diversity 0.003 0.018 0.023 0.018 
Acquirer Portfolio Diversity 0.032 0.009*** 0.032 0.009*** 
Moderators     
Deal Type 0.846 0.997 0.752 0.991 
1.360 0.571*** 1.004 0.605* Target Sales Growth 
Interactions     
-0.027 0.014* -0.027 0.014** Deal Type * Acquirer Portfolio Diversity 
Deal Type * Target Marketing Capability -0.007 0.012 -0.006 0.012 
-0.022 0.007*** -0.018 0.007** Target Firm Sales Growth*T. Marketing Capability 
Controls     
Target Market Share -0.255 -0.255 -0.319 1.189 
Target Industry Competition 0.357 0.674 0.207 0.697 
Target Industry Growth -0.291 0.539 -0.234 0.609 
Target Industry Demand Risk 0.632 0.994 0.289 0.998 
1.310 0.606** 0.576 1.084 Time 
0.508 0.281* 0.371 0.291 Products vs. Services 
1.449 0.309*** 1.273 0.322*** Consumer vs. Business-to-business 
1.838 0.766** 2.126 0.895*** Acquirer Leverage 
Acquirer Financing Consideration 3.713 3.930 7.450 5.373 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio   -1.435 0.811 
Selection Equation     
Intercept   0.062 0.133 
Acquirer Leverage   -0.356 0.479 
Acquirer Financing Consideration   -1.162 2.811 
  7.937 2.980 Acquirer Value Appropriation Emphasis 
  -0.547 0.335 Acquirer Value Creation Emphasis 
Acquirer Firm Size   -0.000 0.002 
Time   0.664 0.737 
n 131 (131) , (250) 
Model F (p-level) 0.000 
  * p <0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
0.000 
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 APPENDIX A 
 
Marketing Capability Score 
 
In this section, we provide the method of computation for marketing capability measure. We 
omit the variable names for ease of exposition. Following section is based on derivations by 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000): 
β β ν== + + −∑0 1kit j jit it itjy x u                                     (A.1) 
μμ σ+  2( , )
iid
iu N  
νν σ  2(0, )
iid
it N  
where yit  is the natural logarithm of sales and xjit  are the natural logarithm of the input 
quantities. 
uit  is the error component that captures time-varying inefficiency effect. 
vit is the idiosyncratic error term. 
uit and vit are assumed to be distributed independently of each other and the covariates in the 
model. 
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where  
N is the number of firms in the industry 
Ti is the last time period in the ith panel 
 39
 
  
{ }
ν
η
σ σ σ
γ σ σ
ε β
η
μ
γσ
− −
= +
=
= −
=
=%
2 2
2 2
( )
2
( )
/
i
S u
u S
it it
t T
it
S
y x
e
z
2
 
Φ()  is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, and 
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ηit  is the decay parameter. When η > 0, the degree of inefficiency decreases over time; when η < 
0 the degree of inefficiency increases over time. 
Maximizing the log-likelihood (A.2)  estimates the coefficients η μ σ, , v , and σu . 
Marketing Capability Score (MCS) is computed as follows: 
MCS = { } { } η μ η ση σ μ σε μ σ
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Maximum marketing capability score is assumed to be 100 and all the other scores are computed 
with respect to 100 point benchmark. 
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 APPENDIX B 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
We use Heckman (1979) two step estimation technique in conducting the analysis. The 
critical component of this technique is the computation of inverse Mills’ ratio. 
The regression equation is 
β= + 1j j jy x u                                                            (B.1) 
The selection equation is 
γ + 2j jz u                                                            (B.2) 
where 
σ 1 (0, )u N  
 2 (0,1)u N  
 
ρ=1 2( , )corr u u  
Probit estimates of the selection equation are obtained from 
γ= ΦPr( ) ( )j j jy observed z z  
From these estimates, inverse Mills’ ratio (a.k.a. nonselection hazard) for each observation j is 
computed as 
φ γ
γ= Φ
ˆ( )
ˆ( )
j
j
j
z
m
z
                                                                (B.3) 
where the φ  is the normal density. 
In the following step, the two-step parameter estimates are obtained by augmenting the 
regression equation with the inverse Mills’ ratio m. Thus, the regressors  become [X m]. 
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 Our Mission  
 
 
The Zyman Institute of Brand Science pursues the advancement of brand-driven 
business performance. 
Founded in 2004, the Zyman Institute of Brand Science is the definitive source for cutting-edge 
knowledge and thinking about brands. The Institute is an independently managed organization 
within the Goizueta Business School at Emory University. 
 
Who we work with 
The Institute works with top management teams to solve pressing issues in brand strategy.  
 
What we do 
The Institute’s lauded scholars lead the development of new knowledge and insights for 
building, maintaining, enhancing, and revitalizing persistently profitable brands. We help 
companies link brand equity to business and shareholder value. We help management make 
decisions in managing brands to accelerate cash flows, enhance cash flows, and reduce 
vulnerability and volatility of cash flows, and optimize the long-term value of the organization.  
 
How we do it 
The Institute works collaboratively with its sponsors, other universities, research organizations, 
and its members to devise cross-disciplinary solutions for managing real world problems in 
brand strategy. We play an integrative role in problem solving, and capability building. We focus 
on viable actions 
 
 
Web: zibs.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
About Emory University 
Emory University is an internationally recognized institution based in Atlanta that was founded 
over 150 years ago. Emory sustains top ranked programs in medicine, law, business, theology, 
nursing, public health, arts & sciences. It supports world-class research across its disciplines.  
 
Web: emory.edu 
  
About Goizueta Business School 
The Goizueta Business School was established in 1919 and is named for Roberto Goizueta, 
former president of The Coca-Cola Company. The school is considered a top-tier school and is 
consistently ranked in the top 20. It offers degrees in business including Bachelor, Master and 
PhD. Its Executive MBA is ranked 10 globally by both BusinessWeek and U.S. News.  
 
Web: goizueta.emory.edu 
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